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Abstract
Since the Brexit referendum, the UK government has deployed a vision of ‘Global Britain’ revolving around trade agree-
ments, yet, thiswas not a key issue in the referendum.Drawing on politicisation literature,we explore the absence of visible
activism around future trade policy, in contrast to moderate activity around the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). We identify actors in UK TTIP mobilisation and trace their actions post-referendum, revealing politici-
sation as campaigners participate in channels for attempting to influence future UK trade policy. In the presence of these
channels and lack of full clarity on future policy, to date, recourse to visible mobilisation in the public space has not yet
occurred. Tracing this dynamic process, intertwining Brexit and trade policy, enables us to understand how politicisation
of one process affects another. Crucially, given the context of re-nationalisation of trade policy, it allows us to explore how
politicisation is operationalised in the absence of one of the key conditions for politicisation suggested in the literature:
the transfer of authority to a more remote level of governance.
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1. Introduction
On 23 June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU by a nar-
row margin. Emotional campaigning in the referendum
gave way to heated exchanges in Parliament, Cabinet,
and themedia as to what shape Brexit should take. Since
the referendum, the UK government has set out to cre-
ate a ‘Global Britain,’ a beacon of free trade, centred
around an independent trade policy. However, trade pol-
icy and trade agreements were not a principal feature of
the referendum, and analyses of the votes attribute the
result to preferences for certain politicians andmigration
positions (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017) and eu-
roscepticism (British Social Attitudes, 2016), rather than
trade policy preferences. UK governments have tradi-
tionally supported liberal trade policies, including within
the EU. Cameron’s government was an active proponent
of TTIP (UK Government, 2015). May’s and Johnson’s
governments have followed suit and pushed for a lib-
eral independent trade policy. Perhaps more surprising
is the absence of overt politicisation of trade in the pub-
lic sphere and visiblemobilisation, especially considering
the significance given to control and sovereignty within
the referendum campaign, and growing salience of trade
policy in the public sphere. Initially, between July 2016
and March 2017, in a Nexis search only a few newspa-
per articles (in The Guardian and The Independent) high-
lighted the dangers of a UK–US trade deal, linking it to
the concerns raised over TTIP by civil society (i.e., po-
tential for National Health Service [NHS] privatisation,
lower consumer standards). As time has progressed and
May’s, and especially Johnson’s governments have taken
a discursive turn towards the promotion of future trade
deals, especially with the US, more media attention has
been garnered to this. Expanding the Nexis search to
end in December 2019, shows how news items on trade
agreements have increased since the original deadline
for Brexit of October 2018. Coverage is split between out-
lets critical of such a prospect (the same ones that de-
nounced TTIP) and which also hold pro-EU editorial lines,
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and ‘leave’ supporting news outlets portraying a poten-
tial deal with the US as a benefit of Brexit (The Times,
The Daily Telegraph).
Politicisation of trade policy in the last decade has
been relatively weak in the UK in comparison with cen-
tral European countries, but TTIP was politicised and
inspired modest mobilisation. Social justice and envi-
ronmental groups, and NHS workers and users demon-
strated against it. Concerns over potential privatisa-
tion of the NHS was key in demonstrations. A num-
ber of organisations participated in cross-European ini-
tiatives such as #StopTTIP and collected signatures for
the Europe Citizens’ Initiative against TTIP. They also coa-
lesced around the UK-based platform, NoTTIP. TTIP was
not a prominent feature in UKmedia, with the exception
of The Guardian and The Independent newspapers. Post-
Brexit trade policy has likewise received relatively little
attention. Considering that a number of the concerns
raised around TTIP will arise in future trade negotiations,
a similar degree of politicisation with regards at least to
future negotiations with the US could be expected, es-
pecially as a network of information sharing and mobil-
isation was created in the UK in the TTIP contestation.
However, thus far, strong politicisation and visible mo-
bilisation around future UK trade policy has not materi-
alised. This article, thus, asks the question of what has
happened to the budding trade politicisation in the UK
and why has it not expressed itself overtly yet concern-
ing the longer-term trade policy of post-Brexit UK?
To answer the question the article charts the politici-
sation of trade policy across time: Within the TTIP con-
troversy, during the referendum, and since the referen-
dum, with respect to future UK trade policy. It does so
by identifying the presence of the key components of
politicisation as described in section two of this article.
Issue salience of, and polarisation of views on, trade
policy in the UK press is tracked using Nexis searches.
Polarisation of views and mobilisation amongst societal
organisations is traced through activist groups’ positions
and activities bymapping groups involved in anti-TTIP ac-
tivism and their positions on the matter as derived from
their websites.
The article proceeds as follows: The next section sets
out the criteria that will be used to determine whether
conditions for politicisation are present in the context of
Brexit. Section 3 considers aspects of politicisation in the
UK around trade policy in the context of TTIP and identi-
fies key actors. Section 4 highlights the lack of salience of
trade policy in the referendum. Section 5 traces the po-
sitions and actions of those actors after the referendum.
The article concludes that politicisation is still there as as-
sociations involved in TTIP campaigning are actively par-
ticipating in channels for (attempting) to influence the
direction of the UK’s future trade policy. In the presence
of these channels, and lack of full clarity as to what the
future trade policy will look like, recourse to demonstra-
tions and more visible politicisation in the public space
has not occurred.
2. Conceptualising Politicisation
Like most concepts in the social sciences, politicisation
is imprecise. It has been defined as the ‘expansion of
the scope of conflict within a political system’ (Grande
& Hutter, 2016), and as an ‘increase in polarisation of
opinions, interests or values and the extent to which
they are publicly advanced towards the process of pol-
icy formulation’ (de Wilde, 2007, p. 20). The existence
of conflicting positions on an issue is, therefore, a key
element of politicisation. Trade policies, especially since
the move towards the inclusion of behind the borders
issues in trade negotiation, have elicited conflicting posi-
tions on trade (see Young, 2017). Different interests, val-
ues, and positions are common in any society, and in and
of themselves do not determine the politicisation of an
issue. For politicisation to occur, an issue needs to be
visible in the public domain (salience), the number of
actors engaged in the issue has to increase, and there
needs to be intensity of conflict over the issue (polarisa-
tion; Hutter & Grande, 2014). Essentially, something is
politicised if it appears often, if different opinions exist
on the matter, and if different social actors are involved
(Zürn, 2016, p. 166). Michael Zürn (2016) critiques a fo-
cus on media in studies of politicisation as an indicator
of issue salience, and points to the importance of civil so-
ciety mobilisation and activism, highlighting how aware-
ness, social mobilisation, and public debate are also ev-
idence of politicisation. He argues that politicisation oc-
curs when an issue is salient (mentioned often in media),
subject to polarised opinions, andwhen different groups
find the issue of importance relative to other issues and
worth mobilising for. For this reason, this article will take
both salience of trade policy, with a focus on trade agree-
ments, and societal activism on trade policy as indicators
of politicisation.
Given the mobilisation, expansion in the number of
actors, and polarisation that occurred in the UK towards
TTIP, despite relatively low salience in general public de-
bates, we would expect to see similar activities in the
post-referendum scenario with respect to trade policy.
Yet, so far this is not the case. From the above concep-
tualisation, we can hypothesise one reason: a relative
lack of importance with respect to other issues, i.e., the
more pressing task of how and what kind of Brexit to
deliver. When it comes to Brexit, as a binary choice of
leaving or remaining in the EU—a ‘soft’ Brexit with a
close economic relationship to the EU or a ‘hard’ Brexit—
politicisation is extremely high. The politicisation and po-
larisation of positions (amongst political groups, across
parties, and the general population) have been evident
in tight electoral results in the referendum and subse-
quent elections in 2017 and 2019. Even in the December
2019 election that delivered Prime Minister Johnson an
absolute majority, 43 percent of voters favoured the
Conservative Party and its diffuse Brexit message, whilst
52.6 percent backed parties opposed to Brexit (or a ‘hard’
Brexit; ‘More people voted against Brexit,’ 2019).
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 348–359 349
The literature on politicisation has placed important
emphasis on how the transfer of authority to new arenas
of multinational governance leads to subsequent con-
testation of legitimacy of these new arenas, and consid-
ers this to be a key driver for politicisation (Costa, 2019;
Peters & Schaffer, 2013). Swen Hutter and Edgar Grande
(2016) refer to three sources of conflict leading to politi-
cisation: loss of sovereignty; threats to national identity;
and transnational sovereignty. Whereas all three were
present in the context of TTIP, and will be present in fu-
ture trade agreements, we hypothesise that the absence
of evident politicisation and civil mobilisation around
trade policy at the present juncture lies in the fact that
currently the discussion revolves around renationalising
trade policy (i.e., regaining sovereignty). Moreover, the
exact form renationalisation will take remains uncertain,
and there is an opportunity structure in place through
government and parliamentary consultations, enabling
trade activists to participate in the process of designing
the UK’s future trade policy. Consequently, key drivers of
politicisation are absent, for now.
3. Budding Politicisation of Trade Policy in the UK
The issue of EU membership has a long history of politici-
sation within the UK, particularly in the press (Daddow,
2012; Startin, 2015), but trade policy politicisation has
been more limited to specific non-governmental organi-
sations (NGO). NGOs activity around trade started with
the contestation of the expansion of trade liberalisa-
tion to services within the negotiation of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services in the late 1980s–1990s,
which entailed transferring some authority over policy
decisions on services to an international organisation,
whose legitimacy was questioned by opponents. At that
time, NGOs founded the Trade Justice Movement net-
work, which has since acted as a lobby group, and has
been heavily involved in transnational NGOs networks
such as Seattle to Brussels exerting pressure on the
European Commission (Strange, 2013). As throughout
this time international trade negotiation authority has
laid with the European Commission, these groups fo-
cused their efforts at the European level. Nonetheless,
they also lobbiedUKparliamentarians to support their po-
sitions on trade and influence theUK government’s views,
and through it, the EU’s trade policy (Strange, 2013).
In the context of TTIP negotiations, EU trade policy
garnered more attention within public debates across
Europe, including in the UK, signalling a budding politici-
sation beyond networked NGOs already active in trade
policy. An analysis of key newspapers in the UK re-
veals that whilst there was some reporting on the
matter, its salience across the broad spectrum of pa-
pers was very limited. A search for articles on TTIP be-
tween 2013 (launch of TTIP negotiations) and December
2016 (suspension of negotiations) on the online news
archive, Nexis, reveals only two major newspapers took
an interest in reporting on TTIP (The Independent and
The Guardian). Both expressed concerns with secrecy in
the negotiations, the potential impact of controversial
investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions, and
both took positions against the agreement. Other outlets
barely covered the developments. The concentration
of coverage was limited to the more left-leaning press,
showing that issue salience, one of the key conditions for
politicisation highlighted in the literature, was limited.
As Michael Zürn (2004) points out, politicisation
needs to also be observed beyond media debates in
other parts of the public domain. In terms of civil so-
ciety mobilisation, TTIP galvanised certain groups in
the UK in a more visible way, despite overall sup-
port for the deal according to Eurobarometer surveys,
where only 19 percent of UK respondents opposed TTIP
in both 2014 and 2016 (European Commission, 2016;
European Parliamentary Research Service Blog, 2015).
Organisations opposed to TTIP, concerned over poten-
tial transfer of authority to a transatlantic regulatory
body, came together under the NoTTIP Platform, which
organised and publicised marches and demonstrations
and encouraged the public to sign the European Citizens’
Initiative against TTIP. Importantly, activists with experi-
ence in trade policy in the UK and EU, like Trade Justice
Movement, mobilised further groups. This helped to in-
crease the salience of the issue, and the number of ac-
tors involved, fulfilling some of Swen Hutter and Edgar
Grande’s (2014) criteria for politicisation.
Of the 54 organisations listed in NoTTIP’s website,
six represented large trade unions, one was the na-
tional branch of a transnational NGO (Friends of the
Earth), one a political party (Greens), and two estab-
lished NGOs working on social justice and trade matters
(Global Justice Now, War on Want). The majority were
small-scale grassroots campaigning groups, interested in
single issues affecting their local communities (e.g., frack-
ing, water use, austerity). Within the grassroots organ-
isations, listed in Box 1, three distinct groups can be
identified: environmental, anti-austerity, and pro-public
services—although the final two are closely related as
anti-austerity groups’ campaign for greater spending and
public service provision.
Anti-TTIP activism by smaller groups was promoted
by the larger groups, who raised awareness of poten-
tial dangers in TTIP and encouraged participation in cam-
paigns. The websites of smaller groups feature posi-
tion papers and materials on TTIP produced by War on
Want and Global Justice Now or direct links to these.
These relationships reflect wider European patterns of
activism against TTIP. The role played by well-resourced
German NGOs, with prior experience opposing geneti-
cally modified organisms in food, as instigators of anti-
TTIP activism has been well-documented (Bauer, 2015,
2016; De Bièvre, 2018). Activists with experience in anti-
globalisation protests from the pan-European Seattle
to Brussels network also took up the TTIP cause and
mobilised in opposition (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015).
Anti-TTIP campaignswere, thus, organised in a top-down
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Box 1. Organisations in NoTTIP.
15M London Assembly
38 Degrees (online campaigning platform)
38 Degrees Haringey
350.org (grassroots campaign against fossil fuels)
Barnet Alliance for Public Services (grassroots
campaigners for public services)
Bring Back British Rail (grassroots campaigners for public
services)
Christian Ecology Link (grassroots campaigners for the
environment)
Community Food Growers Network (grassroots
campaigners for the environment)
Communications Workers’ Union (CWU; Trade Union for
Communications)
Debt Resistance UK (grassroots campaigners against
finance)
DIGS Hackney Renters (grassroots campaigners against
austerity)
Disabled People Against Cuts (grassroots campaigners
against austerity)
European Greens in London
Farms not Factories (grassroots animal welfare)
Food and Water Europe
Frack Free Sussex (grassroots campaigners)
Friends of the Earth, England, Wales and Northern
Ireland
Genetic Engineering Network (grassroots campaigners
against genetically modified organisms)
Global Women’s Strike
GMB (trade union)
Global Justice Now
Green Party (political party)
GreenNet
IOPS London
Jubilee Debt Campaign
Keep Our NHS Public (grassroots campaigners for public
services)
Left Unity
Lewisham People Before Profit
London Federation of Green Parties
Low Impact Living Initiative
New Internationalist magazine
Occupy London (grassroots campaigners against
capitalism, finance)
OurNHS (campaign for public services part of
OpenDemocracy)
People’s Assembly Against Austerity (grassroots against
austerity)
Power for the People (grassroots for public services)
Public and Commercial Services Union (trade union)
Reclaim the Power (grassroots campaigners for public
services)
Red Pepper (online magazine)
Rising Tide UK
Roj Women’s Association (RWA)
STOPAIDS
Student Stop Aids Campaign
SumOfUs
The Landworkers’ Alliance
UK Uncut (grassroots campaigners against austerity)
UNISON (trade union)
Unite (trade union)
University and College Union (UCU)
War on Want
We Own It
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
Young Friends of the Earth (International NGO)
Young Greens (political party)
manner by large experienced civil society organisations
(Eliasson & García-Duran-Huet, 2018), taking advantage
of social media and exaggerated positions to attract pub-
lic and media attention (De Bièvre, 2018).
The larger UK groups (trade unions, Green Party,
large NGOs) involved in TTIP also feature in the list of
members of the pan-European StopTTIP Platform, which
coordinated the European Citizens’ Initiative. StopTTIP
served as an information point collating the activities
of various groups and events organised by members
throughout Europe. Additionally, it promoted the nam-
ing and shaming ofmembers of the European Parliament
voting in favour of proceeding with TTIP negotiations. UK
participants in StopTTIP, listed in Table 1, had a history
of engagement with peers across the EU (e.g., through
the European Trade Union Confederation, Seattle to
Brussels) and belonged to information and resource shar-
ing networks through which they gained heightened
awareness of TTIP. As mentioned previously, they were
also largely responsible for raising awareness and encour-
aging smaller groups in the UK to take up the TTIP cause.
Amongst groups that mobilised in the UK, protec-
tion of public services was a key issue, as per their web-
site statements. For trade unions and grassroots organi-
sations, public services were linked to the controversial
matter of ISDS. Environmental and regulatory concerns
were the key motivation for environmental groups. War
on Want, and Global Justice Now, were especially ac-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 348–359 351
Table 1. UK organisations in StopTTIP.
Organisation Type of Organisation Main TTIP issue
GMB Union Trade Union Privatisation, regulation
NASUWT The Teachers’ Union Trade Union
National Union of Teachers Trade Union Privatisation
Public and Commercial Services Union Trade Union Threat to public services
Scottish Secondary Teachers’ Association Trade Union
The Educational Institute of Scotland Trade Union NHS protection
UNISON Trade Union Protect public services
Unite the Union Trade Union Public services
University and College Union Trade Union
38 Degrees Petition Platform ISDS Corporate power
Artists against TTIP Awareness raising
Bring Back British Rail Advocacy group renationalise rail
CAWN Central America Women’s Advocacy, research on women’s
Network rights
EcoNexus Activism, research network Environment/Genetically-
modified organisms
Friends of the Earth, England, Environmental group
Wales & Northern Ireland
Friends of the Earth, Scotland Environmental group
Global Justice Now Advocacy, campaigning Anti-trade
Green Party, England & Wales Political party Environment/Transparency
Gun Control Network Single issue activism
Highland & Islands against Fracking Environmental activism
Jubilee Debt Campaign Poverty alleviation activism Transparency/Regulatory race to bottom
National Justice & Peace Network Religious advocacy
People and Planet Environmental and social justice
activism
Power for the People Advocacy Renationalise UK energy network
Scottish Education and Action
for Development (SEAD)
Soil Association Organic certification body
Trade Justice Movement Coalition of civil society groups Regulation/ISDS/Effect on developing
world
StopTTIP UK Platform grouping opponents Transparency/Corporate power/ISDS
Student Stop AIDS Campaign
The GAIA Foundation Activism, biocultural diversity, Corporate power/Seeds/Monsanto
ecology, community projects
UK National Hazards Campaign Campaigning, resource centre
tive and held a much broader opposition to TTIP and to
(neo)liberal trade policies. The Trade Justice Movement,
to which many of the NGOs mentioned and unions also
belong, aggregated resources from members and pro-
duced research on trade matters (including TTIP, devel-
opment, and now Brexit and trade policy). It actively
made submissions to Parliament, Government, and the
European Commission, advocating for more progressive
trade policies. Although a key salient issue in the UK con-
text was the perceived threat to public services, espe-
cially the NHS, the broader concerns around ISDS regu-
lation and secrecy that galvanised pan-European mobil-
isation were also present (see Bauer, 2016; De Ville &
Siles-Brügge, 2015).
NoTTIP and StopTTIP websites stopped being up-
dated with the suspension of TTIP negotiations in
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late 2016. However, StopTTIP has been rebranded as
StopISDS and campaigns for a wholesale dismantlement
of ISDS arrangements and a binding UN Treaty to hold
corporations liable for human rights violations (StopISDS,
n.d.). Except for a few cases detailed in the Section 5,
most of these groups have no sections on their web-
sites on post-Brexit trade policy. Seemingly, they have
retreated back to single-issue concerns, and, for now,
are not highlighting and mobilising around the inter-
connection between their issues and potential future
trade policies.
4. Trade in the Referendum Campaign
Although trade policy lies at the heart of the UK’s future
relationship with the EU, and post-Brexit UK, the intrica-
cies of this issue were not elaborated upon in the lead
up to the referendum. Polarisation of positions on EU
membership, which had existed for decades, came to a
crescendo in the campaigns. Analyses reveal that the con-
duct of the referendum (including accusations of lies on
both camps), business and the domestic economy, and
immigration were the issues that dominated media cov-
erage and debates (Deacon, Harmer, Downey, Stanyer, &
Wring, 2016). TheRemain camp sought tomake the econ-
omy the core issue of the referendum, and discussed
advantages of membership and perils of leaving the EU,
whilst the Leave camp focused on critiquing Remain sup-
porters for ‘project fear’ (Moore & Ramsay, 2017, p. 40).
Rehearsing these tropes in the media and campaigns
meant that more complex issues, such as the interaction
of Brexit with trade policy, were insufficiently probed.
Trade did feature in the referendum campaign but
was obscured by other matters. It was an aspect of
broader economic arguments for remaining in the EU
for the Remain camp (Britain Stronger in Europe, n.d.).
Within the Leave narrative of ‘taking back control’
(mainly of borders, laws, and budgets), trade policy fea-
tured as another area to renationalise. The Vote Leave
campaign included trade as number four of its five key
points, after NHS, immigration, and border control. Trade
was encapsulated as: “We’ll be free to trade with the
whole world” (Vote Leave, 2016). Despite the focus on
‘taking back control’ the Leave campaign failed to notice
that future trade agreements could have a constraining
effect on UK domestic policies. Their discursive ‘strate-
gies were aimed at delegitimising the EU as dominating
and constraining the UK in its trading potential and med-
dling with its national sovereignty’ (Zappettini, 2019a,
p. 416). However, for the majority of voters the decision
to vote leave was not determined by liberal economic
imaginaries of Brexiteers, but rather material considera-
tions influenced by narratives around control and migra-
tion (Clarke et al., 2017), and a desire to express their
dissatisfaction with political elites and with their mate-
rial conditions (Green et al., 2016; Koch, 2017). FutureUK
trade policy was, thus, an issue of low salience during the
referendum. Extreme polarisation occurred around the
immediate and pressing Remain–Leave dichotomy, but
not trade policy.
A search of UK national newspapers in Nexis in
the lead-up to the referendum, between the start of
April and 23 June 2016, reiterates the low salience
of future trade policy. Only eleven articles featured
the words ‘trade agreements’ in the title. One was in
The Independent highlighting the threat of Brexit for ex-
isting trade agreements to which the UK is party through
the EU. Nine were in The Guardian, covering the same
issue, or referring to Swiss arrangements with the EU.
One was in The Telegraph, penned by leading Brexit
economist Patrick Minford, arguing for the need to drop
EU protectionist trade policies. A further 183 articles
mentioned trade agreements elsewhere, of which 99 re-
ferred to Trump’s position on the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The remaining 84 explained
how following Norway’s or Switzerland’s relationship
with the EU, or having a preferential trade agreement
with the EU, would differ from EU membership. In brief,
the media focus on trade was not so much on future
trade policy, but on explaining the trading options with
the EU should the UK vote in favour of leaving the EU.
In terms of societal mobilisation, during the referen-
dum, most of the organisations involved in TTIP were
unengaged in trade-related mobilisation. An analysis of
their positions, based on their referendum statements
on websites, reveals most did not have a position on the
referendum, partly because their members themselves
held different positions on Remain and Leave. Exceptions
include the Green Party, Unite, and Friends of the Earth,
who supported the Remain option, based on fear of ero-
sion of environmental and social regulatory protection
outside the EU. The trade union GMB (in Scotland) also
supported Remain. Of the major NGOs active in the UK
anti-TTIP camp, Global Justice Now, after consultation
with its members, supported Remain. War on Want ad-
vocated for leaving the EU to enact a progressive and
left-inspired Brexit including a reversal of preferential
trade agreements.
Post-referendum,May’s government rallied around a
diffuse concept of a ‘Global Britain’ seizing business op-
portunities beyond Europe (Zappettini, 2019b). This be-
came amantra for the newDepartment for International
Trade and incipient trade policy. Yet, it is an area largely
undebated during the referendum, and that has been
entangled in post-referendum discourses on the negotia-
tions with the EU, the outcome of which will determine
any future UK trade policy.
5. Post-Referendum Positions on Trade Policy
There has been a resurgence post-referendum in the
salience of trade policy in the public sphere, not least
given the trade related aspects of the withdrawal from
the EU. A search of UK newspapers between July 2016
and December 2018 on Nexis, reveals 17,420 articles
with the words ‘trade agreements’ in the headlines.
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Articles often dealwith the connectionwith the future re-
lationship with the EU, and with plans to negotiate new
agreements. Whilst The Independent continues to lead
the coverage with 2,924 articles, newpapers that had
barely focused on TTIP have also covered trade agree-
ments post-referendum (e.g., Telegraph, Mail, Express).
The latter tend to focus on elements relating to exiting
the EU (e.g., a trade agreement being contingent on a
divorce bill, the appointment of new trade negotiators).
The Independent and The Guardian continue their line of
raising concerns over potential trade deals that contain
ISDS, regulatory backsliding (as during TTIP coverage),
and highlighting the dangers of a ‘hard Brexit.’ These are
the only general outlets that highlight the potential for
national sovereignty erosion that can result from trade
agreements. The salience of trade in the media and pub-
lic debates has become evident, however, it remains
largely intertwined with the positions and polarisation
on the EU, rather than treated as an independent issue.
In terms of civil society groups’ activism post-
referendum, groups active on TTIP have yet to engage in
obvious public mobilisation on trade, e.g., public demon-
strations. However, an analysis of websites uncovers
clear positioning on trade policy by some groups and par-
ticipation in policy-shaping consultations. A few of these
organisations have specific Brexit positions on trade, re-
vealing largely pro-EU stances. The National Union of
Teachers features a statement that any post-Brexit trade
policy must include a commitment against privatisation.
War on Want focuses on the need to “ensure that the
Leave vote cannot be claimed as a mandate for the UK
to develop its own trade deals on the negative lines that
it has traditionally supported within the EU” (War on
Want, 2016), and calls for a progressive trade policy, in
a briefing that is also available on the National Justice
and Peace Network website. UNISON highlights the po-
tential for trade deals to undermine devolution citing,
and including a link to, a Global JusticeNow report. Other
trade unions under the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) are
active in attempting to influence Brexit. They are con-
cerned about the future of the country being hijacked by
the right, and propose an alternative vision featuring sup-
port for migrants and refugees, no privatisations, an end
to austerity, and maintaining worker rights and protec-
tions. The Soil Association (organic certification body) in-
cludes a statement on the importance of ‘how we trade’
for food and farming, and advocates for the UK retaining
alignment to the EU rather than the US, and for ensuring
high food standards in future trade agreements.
Unsurprisingly, the two most active organisations
against TTIP are articulating broader positions on the
future of trade policy. War on Want highlights its key
principles for trade policy, which encapsulate its objec-
tions to TTIP: protecting workers’s rights, the NHS, and
public services; development-friendly trade policies; and
democratic inputs into trade policy. Global Justice Now
has been especially active in trying to shape post-Brexit
trade policy. They have mobilised over 60,000 people to
send submissions to the Government’s public consulta-
tion on the future of trade policy.When former Secretary
for International Trade, Dr. Fox, published the new Trade
Bill, they launched the campaign to inform and lobby
Members of Parliament (MPs). They have producedwork
regarding the effects of trade on devolution, and are
working with Scottish activists to influence MSPs. Their
aim is for future trade policy to be more transparent,
democratic, and equitable than the EU’s. Their vision for
trade agreements that exclude ISDS, include high stan-
dards, respect labour and environmental standards, and
carve-out public services, countersmany of the concerns
TTIP prompted. In this regard, we can observe that larger
networks with past experience lobbying on trade policy
in the UK and the EU, who instigated anti-TTIP mobilisa-
tion, continue their influencing work within the context
of the UK’s future trade policy.
Encouraging their members to support their submis-
sions to Government consultations follows the same pat-
tern established in the anti-TTIP movement. During TTIP
negotiations, the European Commission launched a pub-
lic consultation on ISDS. It reported that 97 percent
of the submissions had been coordinated through on-
line platforms with the exact same text being submit-
ted (European Commission, 2015, p. 3). This was coor-
dinated by pan-European StopTTIP platform. Large UK
NGOs that stoked anti-TTIP sentiment are, thus, mobilis-
ing the UK part of their networks to take advantage of
opportunities to make their positions known to policy-
makers, and using some of the same tactics as during
anti-TTIP mobilisation. A key difference, however, lies in
the absence of civil demonstrations and protests. During
the campaign against TTIP, 87 public actions were organ-
ised in the UK, representing 10 percent of actions accross
the EU (Caiani & Graziano, 2018, p. 1038). TTIP protests
in the UK followed on from activities in Germany, Austria,
and France, initially orchestrated by the activist group
Attac (De Bièvre, 2018), and were fewer and less well-
attended than in other EUmember states. Thiswas partly
due to more political and discursive opportunities open
to the anti-TTIP movement in the UK through the posi-
tions of independentist and opposition parties (Caiani &
Graziano, 2018), as well as the Trade JusticeMovement’s
years of lobbying MPs (Strange, 2013), and the general
lack of awareness on TTIP given very low media salience.
In the post-referendum context, where the full direction
and content of future UK trade policy and trade negoti-
ations remains imprecise, and with the existence of op-
portunities to participate in policy consultations, large
UK civil society groups working on trade policy are es-
chewing the high visibility activities that their European
partners institigated against TTIP. Instead they are con-
tinuing the engagement and lobbying activity that they
have undertaken for years to try to shape the direction
of future policy.
The process of renationalisation of trade policy, and
the need to develop a new policy, is creating a unique op-
portunity for civil society groups with expertise in trade
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to participate in policy creation and attempt to shape
future UK policy. It is also bringing trade policy-making
to a level of governance that is more approachable for
them, and where they can leverage their past experi-
ences lobbying MPs and ties developed with MPs and in-
dependendist parties during the TTIP campaigns. Being
able to access policy-making circles, and the consulta-
tive processes in policy-making, eliminates the imme-
diate need to engage in in the kinds of public protest
activities that charaterised politicisation of trade policy
in the context of TTIP. This possibility for influencing
runs counter to the authority transfer hypothesis that ex-
plains themotivation behind politication in the literature,
when groups react to the shift of decision-making pow-
ers to a more international level of governance that they
see as less legitimate, and to the consequent dilution of
national sovereignty this entails (Costa, 2019; Peters &
Schaffer, 2013).
The present juncture of trade policy creation, has en-
abled activist groups to take a leading role in suggest-
ing how future UK trade policy should be organised. The
publication of A Trade Governance Model that Works for
Everyone (hereafter Model) in response to Government
consultations represents an interesting development.
The Model was co-authored by business associations,
trade unions, and a trade NGO (Confederation of British
Industry, ICC United Kingdom, Trade Justice Movement,
and UNITE the Union). It advocates for a trade policy that
ensures consensus-building (through stakeholder partic-
ipation at all stages), transparency (with access to docu-
ments at all stages), scrutiny (in Parliament, with votes),
and a holistic approach to trade (including credible mit-
igation plans, and labour and environmental objectives)
(Trade Justice Movement, 2018). Unlike during TTIP ne-
gotiations, when business groupswere largely in support
of TTIP (Dür & Lechner, 2015), theModel brings the ma-
jor UK business associations together with trade unions
and NGOs to produce a document with language that
incorporates concerns raised by anti-TTIP groups. The
most active and knowledgeable groups from the anti-
TTIP campaigns are making use of all the channels avail-
able to them through government consultations and en-
gaging with groups previously on the opposite side to de-
mand improved trade policies, without the need to en-
gage in high visibility public demonstrations. The strat-
egy is about taking advantages of a unique opportunity
structure presented by the repatriation of trade author-
ity from Brussels to London. This situation of renation-
alisation contrasts with the case of TTIP. In the latter,
the possible creation of a transatlantic body for regu-
lation and transfer of regulatory decision-making pow-
ers to this remote body was a key aspect giving rise to
politicisation and opposition (Costa, 2019). Such a trans-
fer of authority through executive multilateralism is an
important condition for politicisation (Peters & Schaffer,
2013; Zürn, 2004). In the early evolution of a UK trade
policy, this condition is absent. Instead, it is the type of
future trade policy, a more progressive socially and envi-
ronmentally sensitive trade policy, as advocated by the
Trade Governance Model signatories, or a more neolib-
eral trade policy, that instigates divergent opinions and
potential politicisation.
The Government’s White Paper on Preparing for our
Future Trade Policy (UK Government, 2017) is generic
in its content, and includes many demands of civil soci-
ety. It claims trade policy will be inclusive and transpar-
ent. A consultation with stakeholders on how to achieve
this has been launched. It purports trade policy will sup-
port developing countries. It commits the Government
to maintaining high standards of consumer, worker, and
environmental standards in trade agreements, and en-
sure trade policy works for everyone through the use
of trade remedies and the Industrial Policy. The absence
of detail as to how to achieve this makes it impossible
to ascertain whether trade policy will shift towards the
type of trade policy that has been advocated by activist
groups. The language and commitments in this docu-
ment, and numerous consultations taking place, could
indicate an awareness of the need to incorporate chal-
lenging voices into trade policy, to prevent the type of
opposition that TTIP instigated. One concrete action that
the Government has taken in the direction of incorpora-
tion of non-government actors and views in trade pol-
icy, and, perhaps, to compensate for the relative ab-
sence of in-house expertise on trade, has been the cre-
ation of a Strategic Advisory Group of 16 representatives
frombusiness and civil societywithin theDepartment for
International Trade (DIT). This is reminiscent of oneof the
European Commission’s reponses to anti-TTIP mobilisa-
tion, namely the creation in 2017 of an Expert Group on
TradeAgreements composedof civil society andbusiness
representations. Box 2 shows the initial members of the
UK’s Strategic Advisory Group.
Institutionally, the UK has had to create trade pol-
icy capacity since the referendum, starting with the cre-
ation of DIT. The problem of lack of in-house exper-
tise has been a common criticism raised against DIT
and the Government (de Jonquieres, 2019; Illot, Skelt,
& Rutter, 2017; ‘Meet the man,’ 2019). High profile ap-
pointments of former EU negotiators and those of other
nationalities, and the launch of a new dedicated trade
career stream within the civil service in 2019, form part
of the Government’s preparations for an independent
trade policy. The time lag involved in this institution-
building process and political delays given the paralysis
in Parliament on Brexit prior to the 2019 election has
meant that the UK still has not fully articulated its future
trade policy. This makes it difficult for civil society organi-
sations to respond and determine whether public mobili-
sation strategies such as those orchestrated against TTIP
are pertinent. For now, organisations are exploiting op-
portunities to inform policy-makers and politicians (par-
ticularly pro-EU ones) and to respond to Parliamentary
enquiries and DIT white papers to ensure their positions
and visions for future trade policy are noted, as trade pol-
icy authority is repatriated to the national level.
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Box 2. DIT’s strategic trade advisory group (2019–2020).
DIT Minister for Trade Policy (chair)
Professor Holger Breinlich, University of Surrey (academia)
Carolyn Fairbairn, Confederation of British Industry (business representative organisation)
Gary Campkin, City UK (services, business representative organisation)
Dr. Scott Steedman CBE, British Standards Institution (standards)
Caroline Normand, Which? (consumer)
Dr. Dirk Willem te Velde, Overseas Development Institute (developmental)
Mark Abrams, Trade Finance Global (new entrant)
Michael Gidney, Fair Trade Foundation (non-government organisations)
Nick Coburn CBE, Ulster Carpets (Northern Ireland business)
Denise Valin Alvarez, Burberry (regional business)
Liz Cameron OBE, Scottish Chamber of Commerce (Scottish business)
Sean Ramsden, Ramsden International (small and medium enterprise)
Mike Cherry OBE, Federation of Small Business (business representative organisation)
Sam Lowe, Centre for European Refor, (think tanks)
Paul Nowak, Trade Union Congress (trade unions)
Prys Morgan, Kepak Group Limited (Welsh business)
6. Conclusion
This article has tracked politicisation of trade policy in
the UK since TTIP negotiations, by looking at newspa-
per stances on the matter, and at the positions and ac-
tions of civil society groups and campaigners. The article
has found that, whilst the salience of trade policy and
trade agreements has increased exponentially, politici-
sation of future UK trade policy, for now, remains con-
tained. As the analysis of newspaper articles on trade
conducted on Nexis has shown, there has been amarked
increase in the salience of trade issues in the UK. Trade
and trade agreements have become very salient in the
media and political debates, and views on these mat-
ters are highly polarised, fulfilling some of the key condi-
tions for politicisation identified in the literature (Hutter
& Grande, 2014), but this has not translated into visi-
ble mobilisation as in the case of TTIP. As Michael Zürn
(2016) highlights, a critical factor determining politici-
sation is for a salient issue, subject to polarised opin-
ions to be deemed relatively more important than other
issues. To date, post-Brexit trade policy has been sub-
sumed into themore pressingmatter of delivering Brexit,
in the hierarchy of issues. The marginal referendum re-
sult, and May’s loss of a Parliamentary majority in 2017,
created a space for politicians across the political spec-
trum, and for society, to re-enact the tropes of the ref-
erendum in attempts to either stop Brexit, or ensure a
‘soft’ Brexit. Future UK trade policy has, however, played
a role at Parliamentary level in the battle to determine
the meaning of Brexit in policy terms. The European
Research Group of the Conservative Party, with its vision
for an ‘unshackled’ UK and neoliberal policy inclinations,
helped steer May’s Brexit negotiations with the EU to-
wards a looser future relation governed by a trade agree-
ment, facilitating an independent trade policy. Without
a clear majority for May’s projected Brexit, groups con-
cerned about this and possible implications of other fu-
ture trade agreements, focused their energies in differ-
ent ways. Parliamentarians continued to stymie the pass-
ing of the Withdrawal Agreement and to seek amend-
ments to steer Brexit in other directions, rehearsing the
Leave-Remain, and ‘soft’ vs. ‘hard’ Brexit dichotomies.
The 2019 electoral campaign was also run along these
lines. The Conservatives focused on a vague ‘Get Brexit
Done’ slogan that obscured the underlying choices and
challenges involved in Brexit. The Liberal Democrats cam-
paigned on a Remain platform supportive of a second
referendum, and Labour supported a renegotiation of
the Withdrawal Agreement and a confirmatory public
vote. Again, politicisation occurred along the pro- and
anti-EU axis instead of longer-term economic and trade
policy consequences.
The scrutiny of the positions of civil society organisa-
tions that had been active against TTIP, as derived from
their websites and policy documents, has revealed that
the key groups (Global Justice Now, War on Want, Trade
Justice Movement), have articulated clear positions on
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post-Brexit trade policy and have been attempting to in-
fluence its evolution. They have produced information
and research to steer policy-makers towards a Brexit
with close relations to the EU. As regards to trade pol-
icy, they have engaged in opportunities for influence gar-
nered by the creation of a new institutional set-up for
trade policy. Interesting evolutions in the behaviour of
these groups have also been observed, such as siding
with business interests to produce a progressive Model
Trade Governance plan submitted to the DIT. Civil society
groups with interests in trade have also been participat-
ing in Government consultations on the future of trade
policy, which are creating an opportunity to pre-empt
rather than react to policy choices and consequences,
within the process of regaining sovereignty over trade
policy. Future research will have to analyse if these op-
portunities actually translate into genuine influence in
shaping future trade policy. Nonetheless, the initial in-
clusion of civil society groups and, at least, the theo-
retical commitment to greater inclusivity as per the pa-
per Preparing for Our Future Trade Policy, and the cre-
ation of the Strategic Advisory Group of representatives,
can help to enhance the legitimacy of trade policy and
counter potential politicisation and subsequent mobilisa-
tion. Opinion polls suggest that there is support for the
Government’s agenda for a liberal trade policy, with 66
percent of those polled in favour (Vasilopoulou, Keith, &
Taalving, 2020), something that further limits the imme-
diate potential for public mobilisation. Positive attitudes
towards trade becomemore complex when respondents
are asked about their impressions of post-Brexit trade
agreements, with 42 percent holding positive views and
41 percent negative perceptions, tingedwith some of the
concerns voiced in the left leaningmedia around US chlo-
rinated chickens, and showing a clear correlation with
personal positions on Brexit (Vasilopoulou et al., 2020).
Trust in Government in the UK remains low at 40 percent,
despite increasing by four percent since the 2019 elec-
tion, according to the Edelman (2020) Trust Barometer.
In a climate of distrust and continued high polarisation
along Brexit and anti-Brexit lines, the potential for politici-
sation and more overt public contestation of post-Brexit
trade agreement negotiations remains significant.
With trade policy subsumed, for now, in the Brexit
process, and opportunities for civil society organisations
to participate in the shaping of future trade policy as new
institutions are created to deal with the renationalisation
of trade policy, politicisation of UK trade policy remains
partial. Despite growing salience, the relationship with
the EU continues to top the hierarchy of issues. Whilst
there are polarised views on the future trade policy, ac-
tivist groups have managed to forge a network, includ-
ing business representatives to collaborate in the pro-
posal of a more progressive trade policy (Model Trade
Governance). They also have opportunities to attempt to
determine future policy, further containing the need to
engage in the mobilisation of the public and smaller civil
society groups that were mobilised against TTIP.
However, full clarity on how the Government and
DIT will incorporate civil society in future trade policy
and negotiations, on how an inclusive, fair, and balanced
trade policy will be achieved, is still forthcoming. Should
trade policy take a different turn, for example, as key
players in the anti-TTIP mobilisation could shift tactics,
and once again engage their networks to contest un-
wanted developments. The 2019 election result handing
Johnson a government majority, facilitated parliamen-
tary approval of his renegotiatedWithdrawal Agreement,
opening the way for Brexit and eventual trade agree-
ments. In the first days post-election, Johnson’s govern-
ment’s tone hardened with respect to the future re-
lation with the EU. He rejected an extension of the
post-Brexit negotiation period. Former cabinetmembers
stated the Government wished to diverge from EU regu-
lations (which would enable the hard Brexiteers’ neolib-
eral vision and controversial trade agreements with the
US; ‘David Davis: UKwill diverge,’ 2019).Moveswere also
made to facilitate changing EU laws post-Brexit through
lower courts (‘Lower courts can roll back,’ 2019).Whilst it
remains unclear how future trade agreements and poli-
cies will evolve, and how the commitment to inclusion
and scrutiny will be implemented in the new political
situation of a majority Brexit parliament, if the initial
stance of post-election days is a harbinger of a turn to-
wards a more aggressive neoliberal trade policy outside
the EU, active contestation and mobilisation against this
is more likely to errupt. Within the context of Brexit,
salience of trade and trade agreements in the media and
Parliamentary debates has increased dramatically since
the days of TTIP. As Brexit becomes a reality, the de-
bate will turn more explicitly to trade agreements and
future trade policy, and it will rise in the hierarchy of is-
sues, making more visible mobilisation and politicisation
more likely, as future trade negotiations, especially with
the US, will involve a potential loss of sovereignty, which
was a key factor influencing politicisation of TTIP (Peters
& Schaffer, 2013). Other key underlying conditions for
politicisation (salience and polarised opinions) already
exist. It is the more pressing matter of Brexit—the lack
of full clarity around future trade policy—and with it the
hope that demands for a progressive trade policymay yet
materialise, that has kept politicisation at bay and activist
groups from engaging in more visible mobilisation.
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